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In April 2006, the Judiciary Committee of the Minnesota 
Senate defeated a proposed amendment1 to the state constitution.2  
 
       †  Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law.  Thanks are due to my 
research assistant, Elizabeth Dwyer.  Appreciation is also expressed to Professor 
Eileen Scallen and Philip Duran, Staff Attorney for OutFront Minnesota, for their 
helpful comments and notes.  Special thanks are also in order to Ann DeGroot, 
Executive Director of OutFront Minnesota.  Any faults or misjudgments herein are 
exclusively my own. 
 1. H.F. 6, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2005). 
 2. The State Senate Judiciary Committee defeated the proposal, through a  
four-to-five vote, on April 4.  See Tom Scheck, Committee Defeats Marriage 
Amendment (Apr. 4, 2006), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/ 
2006/04/04/marriagehearing/. 
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This amendment would have permanently affixed sexual 
orientation discrimination into the text of that document.  Its 
proponents tried to advance it as a “marriage” amendment, but its 
effects would have extended far beyond formal marriage.  It would 
have foreclosed the recognition of same-sex civil unions and 
domestic partnerships as well.3  Most probably, it also would have 
been interpreted to prohibit other civil protections for lesbian and 
gay couples, such as joint health insurance benefits—especially for 
public employees. 
In spite of this proposal’s defeat last year, some are still trying 
to keep alive the prospect of adopting such an amendment in the 
future.4  This effort should be resisted.  As noted above, the 
amendment had much more wide-ranging effects than was 
commonly realized at the time.  But the obtrusively broad scope of 
this amendment is only part of what makes it so pernicious.  The 
main issue for confrontation is the amendment’s deeply anti-
democratic nature.5 
Using a constitutional amendment to try to resolve a 
compelling issue in political discourse is inherently anti-
democratic.  Any issue that is made the subject of a constitutional 
amendment is thereby placed outside the sphere of democratic 
decision making.  If a constitutional amendment on any particular 
issue is adopted, it no longer matters thereafter what either the 
popular or legislative will is or may become on that issue.  The 
resolution of the issue is foreclosed by the permanence of the 
constitutional amendment. 
This deadening effect on democracy would be especially 
preclusive in the field of lesbian and gay rights in Minnesota.  Even 
if one is not predisposed to be sympathetic to lesbian and gay 
rights, one can observe clear trends in recent Minnesota legal and 
political history demonstrating that lesbian and gay rights have 
been the subject of vibrant and dynamic public discussion.6  The 
treatment of lesbian and gay rights in this state has been very much 
a subject of democratic debate and majoritarian consideration. 
 
 3. See infra Part I. 
 4. E.g., Teresa Stanton Collett, Constitutional Confusion:  The Case for the 
Minnesota Marriage Amendment, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1029 (2007). 
 5. See Dale Carpenter, Four Arguments Against a Marriage Amendment that Even 
an Opponent of Gay Marriage Should Accept, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 71, 89 (2004) 
(providing an analogous point regarding proposed amendments to the Federal 
Constitution). 
 6. See infra Parts II, III. 
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Historically, Minnesota has allowed the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual 
and, Transgender (“LGBT”) community to pursue its aims in the 
marketplace of public ideas.7  Sometimes the LGBT community has 
won the democratic debate, and sometimes it has lost.8  But the 
debate has always been open.  On those occasions when the LGBT 
community has lost, it has always had the option to return to the 
public forum and once again press its claims in the democratic 
arena.  A constitutional amendment of this type would fly in the 
face of this tradition and cut off legislative debate on this centrally 
important issue. 
The Minnesota Legislature—and its electorate—has thus been 
open, to varying degrees over time, to the concerns of the LGBT 
community.9  The same is really not quite as true concerning the 
most significant actions of the Minnesota courts.10  In general, the 
most cogent actions of the more senior and influential Minnesota 
courts in recent years have demonstrated a notable coolness to the 
interests of the LGBT community.11  The one definitive state court 
ruling that sided wholly with the state’s LGBT community was 
issued by a mere county trial court,12 had limited direct effects, and 
was, in any event, quickly superseded by federal case law.13  In 
general, our state courts have been notably slow to come to the aid 
of the LGBT community outside the legislative process.14 
Accordingly, there is no good reason to suppose that any 
action would be forthcoming from Minnesota courts to judicially 
alter the majoritarian character of the debate.  The potential for 
court action therefore presents no adequate basis for a 
constitutional amendment in this area. 
But even if Minnesota courts (contrary to past behavior) were 
to become more actively in favor of the LGBT community in this 
area—and even if concern over this trend encouraged a 
constitutional amendment—any amendment could serve its aims 
just as effectively after any such judicial determination as before it.  
The eagerness of some activists to rush to amendment—even 
 
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. See infra Part II. 
 9. See infra Part II. 
 10. See infra Part III. 
 11. See infra Part III. 
 12. Doe v. Ventura, No. MC 01-489, 2001 WL 543734 (Minn. Dist. Ct. May 15, 
2001); see infra Part III.D. 
 13. See infra Part III.D. 
 14. See infra Part III. 
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before any state court has given any credible indication of an 
expansionary trend in this area—betrays those advocates’ distrust 
for the democratic process. 
Furthermore, the text of the specific amendment that pro-
discrimination activists are advancing is so broad that their real aim 
cannot be consistent with the protection of legislative democracy. 
Rather, the extreme breadth of their proposal strongly indicates a 
disdain—rather than a respect—for the democratic process. 
In summary, respect for legislative democracy—quite apart 
from any preconceived notions about the value of same-sex 
relationships—requires the rejection of any constitutional 
amendment intended to discriminate against such relationships. 
I. THE BROAD SCOPE OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT 
Before proceeding further with discussions concerning the 
proposed amendment, it is appropriate to briefly examine its text 
and comment on its extreme breadth.  It is phrased so broadly that 
it almost certainly precludes same-sex civil unions, as well as formal 
marriages.  And it might also prevent certain private arrangements, 
such as employer-provided health insurance for the same-sex 
partners of employees.  The sheer breadth of the proposal is in 
itself a strong reason for disapproving it.  The proposed language 
reads as follows: 
“Only the union of one man and one woman shall be 
valid or recognized as a marriage in Minnesota.  Any other 
relationship shall not be recognized as a marriage or its 
legal equivalent.”15 
The remarkable breadth of the language emanates chiefly 
from its second sentence, which declares that “[a]ny other 
relationship shall not be recognized” as the “legal equivalent” of 
marriage.16  One of the primary characteristics of civil unions—as 
they have developed in states such as Vermont17 and 
Connecticut18—is precisely that they are the exact equivalent, in 
terms of statutory rights and responsibilities, of formal marriage.19  
 
 15. S.F. 1691, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2005) (containing the language of 
the most recent bill).  Professor Collett cites identical language in an earlier bill.  
Collett, supra note 4, at 1048. 
 16. Minn. S.F. 1691. 
 17. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201–07 (2002 & Supp. 2006). 
 18. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b-38aa to 46b-38pp (Supp. 2006). 
 19. Indeed, one aspect of the opinion of the Vermont Supreme Court in 
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Their appeal and acceptability to many gay-rights activists lies 
principally in this equivalence. 
The proposal declares that no relationship, other than 
between a man and a woman, can be the “legal equivalent” of 
marriage.20  By its terms, this language would seem to preclude a 
civil-union regime in which the partners to a civil union receive the 
equivalent rights and undertake the equivalent obligations of 
marriage. 
The probable effects of this language extend far beyond the 
disavowal of civil unions and domestic partnerships.  Several courts 
around the country have already interpreted language such as this 
in recently adopted state constitutional amendments.  Many have 
interpreted these provisions to prohibit virtually any type of 
recognition of same-sex couples for any governmental purpose. 
The most recent example is a ruling from the Michigan Court 
of Appeals holding that Michigan’s amendment—broadly similar to 
the Minnesota proposal—precludes any grant of same-sex domestic 
partner benefits to any employees of the state or its governmental 
subdivisions.21  An example from last year is from an Ohio appellate 
court holding that Ohio’s constitutional amendment prevented 
that state’s domestic violence statute from protecting unmarried 
couples—even those in different-sex relationships.22  Each of the 
state constitutional amendments varies from the others at least 
slightly in some particulars,23 and other courts have reached 
 
Baker v. State was that civil unions would be an acceptable mode of relief under the 
court’s decision only to the extent that civil unions provided for the same rights 
and responsibilities as formal marriage.  744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999). 
 20. Minn. S.F. 1691. 
 21. Nat’l Pride at Work v. Michigan, No. 265870, 2007 WL 313582 (Mich. Ct. 
App. Feb. 1, 2007).  The Michigan amendment reads as follows: “‘To secure and 
preserve the benefits of marriage for our society and for future generations of 
children, the union of one man and one woman in marriage shall be the only 
agreement recognized as a marriage or similar union for any purpose.’”  Id. at *1 
n.2 (quoting MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 25).  The court of appeals reversed the trial 
court.  Id. at *1. 
 22. State v. Ward, 849 N.E.2d 1076, 1082 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006).  Contra State 
v. Burk, 843 N.E.2d 1254 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). 
 23. The Ohio amendment reads as follows: 
Only a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage valid 
in or recognized by this state and its political subdivisions.  This state and 
its political subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal status for 
relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to approximate the 
design, qualities, significance or effect of marriage. 
OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11; see also Burk, 843 N.E.2d at 1255 (quoting OHIO CONST. 
art. XV, § 11). 
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different conclusions.24  But there is no shortage of examples for 
the very broad application of these kinds of amendments. 
Furthermore, the Minnesota proposal language goes on to 
suggest that it may prohibit private arrangements that provide 
marriage-like considerations for same-sex couples or families.25  
The proposal states that “[a]ny other relationship shall not be 
recognized as a marriage or its legal equivalent.”26  The language 
does not say that the State of Minnesota shall not recognize such a 
relationship; rather, it says that no such relationship shall “be” 
recognized.27  The State of Minnesota is not stated as the party 
whose recognition is precluded, but instead the broader phrase—
using the word “be”—is deployed.28  The inference is entirely 
plausible, even reasonable, that no one in the state having the 
capacity through contractual means (or any other means) shall 
recognize an alternative relationship as a marital equivalent.29 
This could apply in a broad variety of contexts: from those as 
relatively minor as “family” gym club memberships to those as 
major as “family” coverage or “domestic partner” coverage in 
employee health benefit programs.  Clearly the gym clubs and 
employee benefit plans are in some sense “recognizing” the same-
sex relationships in these contexts as something approximating a 
marital relation.  It would be open to a reviewing court to interpret 
 
 24. E.g., Nat’l Pride at Work v. Granholm, No. 05-368-CZ, 2005 WL 3048040, 
at *7 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Sept. 27, 2005) (holding that Michigan’s constitutional 
amendment did not preclude public employers from recognizing same-sex 
domestic partners for purposes of providing medical insurance benefits), rev’d sub 
nom. Nat’l Pride at Work v. Michigan, No. 265870, 2007 WL 313582 (Mich. Ct. 
App. Feb. 1, 2007); Burk, 843 N.E.2d at 1258 (holding “that Ohio’s domestic 
violence statute, insofar as it defines ‘family or household member’ to include 
unmarried individuals who live as spouses, is constitutional and coexists in 
harmony” with Ohio’s constitutional amendment). 
 25. See S.F. 1691, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2005). 
 26. Id. (emphasis added). 
 27. Id. (emphasis added). 
 28. Id. 
 29. See id.  The inference is all the more foreseeable since an alternative bill 
was introduced at broadly the same time as the language favored by Professor 
Collett.  See Collett, supra note 4, at 1048.  The language of that alternative bill 
indeed limited its effect to non-recognition “by the state or any of its subdivisions.”  
H.F. 6, 2d Engrossment, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2005).  Assuming the 
language favored by Professor Collett was adopted as an amendment, a reviewing 
court could easily draw the conclusion that—since the language is broader than 
the earlier version limited to the state government for its effects—the broader 
language in the amendment should not be so limited in the way that the earlier 
(unadopted) language was limited. 
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the proposed constitutional language to preclude these private 
relationships, as well as government sanctions. 
II. LGBT RIGHTS IN MINNESOTA LEGISLATIVE ACTION 
The history of legislation concerning Minnesota’s LGBT 
community presents a varying pattern of victories and defeats over 
time.  The first advances for the community were recorded at the 
level of municipal legislation in the state’s two largest cities.  The 
history of these municipal legislative efforts was somewhat 
tumultuous in St. Paul—at least in the early years—but has been 
somewhat less eventful in Minneapolis. 
A. The Minneapolis and St. Paul Human Rights Ordinances 
The Minneapolis Civil Rights ordinance was amended in 1974 
to include protection on the basis of “affectional or sexual 
preference.”30  At that time, the ordinance prohibited 
discrimination in employment, labor relations, real property 
transactions, public accommodations, public services, and 
banking.31  Protected categories that had previously been included 
were race, color, creed, religion, ancestry, national origin, and 
sex.32  The addition of a sexual orientation category to a civil rights 
ordinance was a substantially progressive act in 1974.33  Since this 
amendment took effect, there has been little agitation for any 
alteration to its text or effects. 
In St. Paul, the legislative situation has been somewhat more 
lively over the years.  The City of St. Paul had an anti-discrimination 
ordinance in place as early as 1956.34  At that time, the subject area 
chiefly covered was employment discrimination.35  The 
classifications initially protected were race, color, religious creed, 
 
 30. Minneapolis, Minn., Ordinance 99-68 (1974) (amending MINNEAPOLIS, 
MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 945 (relating to Civil Rights)). 
 31. Id. § 3. 
 32. Id. §§ 1–4. 
 33. The amendment defined “affectional or sexual preference” as “having or 
manifesting an emotional or physical attachment to another consenting person or 
persons, or having or manifesting a preference for such attachment.”  Id. § 2. 
 34. ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 74.01 (1956). 
 35. E.g., id. § 74.01(2) (providing that “discrimination in employment tends 
unjustly to subject groups of inhabitants of any city to depressed living conditions 
thereby causing injury to the public safety, general welfare, and good order of any 
city and endangers the public health thereof”). 
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national origin, and ancestry.36  The City Council amended the law 
in 1974, adding “affectional preference” to the list of protected 
classifications.37  This generally corresponded in time and effect to 
the amendment in Minneapolis. 
The St. Paul amendment was not met with universal 
enthusiasm by the political community.38  During the late 1970s, 
the singer Anita Bryant was leading a national campaign to oppose 
the nascent gay rights movement.39  Her campaign used the 
moniker, “Save Our Children.”40  Largely as a result of this 
campaign’s efforts in St. Paul, a popular referendum repealed the 
1974 “affectional preference” amendment in 1978.41 
The issue was reawakened in 1990 when the City Council once 
again added “sexual or affectional orientation” to the list of 
protected classes in the ordinance.42  This time, the definition 
employed in the St. Paul ordinance was noteworthy.  During this 
period, the phrase “sexual orientation” was generally considered to 
apply to affective orientation, and, accordingly, to comprise 
homosexual, heterosexual, or bisexual orientation.  State statutes in 
effect at this time were broadly consistent with this view of the 
meaning of “sexual orientation.”43 
The St. Paul ordinance took the definitional step of 
attempting to include transgender persons as well.44  The definition 
included not only homosexuality, heterosexuality, and bisexuality, 
but also “having or being perceived as having a self-image or 
identity not traditionally associated with one’s biological maleness 
or one’s biological femaleness.”45  This was one of the earliest 
legislative efforts to specifically include transgender persons in civil 
rights protections based on sexual orientation. 
Then, in 1991, anti-gay activists again agitated for repeal of the 
 
 36. Id. § 74.01(1). 
 37. Telephone Interview by Elizabeth Dwyer with Ann DeGroot, Executive 
Director, OutFront Minnesota, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Feb. 15, 2007). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 183.01 (1990). 
 43. For example, the 1993 version of the Wisconsin state anti-discrimination 
law defined “sexual orientation” as “having a preference for heterosexuality, 
homosexuality, or bisexuality, having a history of such a preference or being 
identified with such a preference.”  WIS. STAT. § 111.32(13)(m) (1993). 
 44. See ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE, § 183.02(26). 
 45. See id. 
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civil rights protections for LGBT persons—again using the 
mechanism of a popular initiative.46  In response, activists of the 
LGBT community organized a vibrant “No Repeal” campaign.47  
This “No Repeal” campaign was successful,48 and the coverage of 
sexual orientation—with its relatively comprehensive definition—
has remained undisturbed in the St. Paul ordinance ever since.49 
B. The Minnesota Hate Crime Statute 
The Minnesota legislature enacted a comprehensive hate 
crime statute in 1989.50  This was a statute of the sentence-
enhancement variety that provided for enhanced punishment of 
those convicted defendants who had perpetrated certain violent 
crimes “because of” the particular societal group(s) to which the 
victims belonged.51  The passage of this statute was 
contemporaneous with an active national movement in almost all 
states to pass sentence-enhancement statutes of this kind.52 
Not all of these state statutes contained express protections for 
members of the LGBT community, and some still do not.  The 
Minnesota statute, however, has expressly included “sexual 
orientation” in its list of protected classifications from its 
inception.53 
Accordingly, in the adoption of the state’s first comprehensive 
sentence-enhancement hate crime statute, the legislature 
demonstrated its interest in helping to secure the personal safety of 
members of the state’s LGBT community.  There has never been 
any serious effort to amend or repeal the hate-crime protections of 
 
 46. Jim Ragsdale, Gay-Rights Issue May Be Decided by Voter Turnout, ST. PAUL 
PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), Nov. 1, 1991, at 1A. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE, § 183.02(26). 
 50. Act of May 25, 1989, ch. 261, 1989 Minn. Laws 892. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See generally Anthony S. Winer, Hate Crimes, Homosexuals, and the 
Constitution, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 387, 419–27 (1994) (providing a 
background on the general movement to enact hate crime statutes in the late 
twentieth century). 
 53. The current hate crimes act is codified at a variety of statutory sections.  
E.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.595, subdivs. 1a, 2, 3 (2006) (criminal damage to property 
in the second-, third-, and fourth-degrees); § 609.749, subdiv. 3 (aggravated 
violations of harassment and stalking); § 609.2231, subdiv. 4 (assaults motivated by 
bias); § 626.5531 (reporting of crimes motivated by bias).  Each of these sections 
includes “sexual orientation” as a protected classification. 
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this statute for LGBT Minnesotans. 
C. The Minnesota Civil Rights Act 
Minnesota adopted the predecessor of its current Civil Rights 
Statute in 1967.54 The law in force at that time prohibited 
discrimination in employment, housing and real property, public 
accommodations, public services, and education55 on the basis of 
race, color, creed, religion, or national origin.56  Over the years, the 
categories of people protected from discrimination increased.  The 
current categories are: race, color, creed, religion, national origin, 
sex, marital status, status with regard to public assistance, disability, 
sexual orientation, or age.57 
The legislature added sexual orientation as a protected 
classification in 1993.58  This legislative change substantially 
improved the legal position of LGBT people in the state, because 
for the first time they were legally protected statewide from being 
fired, evicted, or refused business based on their LGBT status.59  
There was opposition to this legislation while the legislature was 
considering it.  Indeed, the proponents of the legislation were 
required to include—as part of the statutory modification—
assurances that the inclusion of sexual orientation did not express 
approval of homosexuality, bisexuality, or any equivalent lifestyle; 
did not authorize affirmative action with respect to “homosexuality 
or bisexuality;” and did not authorize same-sex marriage.60 
Thus, although many LGBT people justly viewed the passage 
of statewide-civil-rights protections as a victory, the victory was 
acquired at some cost.  The popular uneasiness at the time with the 
issue of sexual orientation caused the legislature to insert 
additional language that many might feel to be irrelevant and 
disrespectful.  But in the give-and-take of legislative debate, this was 
the text of the law that the legislature ultimately adopted. 
 
 54. Act of May 25, 1967, ch. 897, 1967 Minn. Laws 1932. 
 55. Id. §§ 10 (housing), 11 (education), 12 (employment), 13 (real property), 
14 (public accommodations), 15 (public services), 16 (educational institution). 
 56. E.g., id. § 13. 
 57. MINN. STAT. § 363A.08. 
 58. Act of April 2, 1993, ch. 22, § 19, 1993 Minn. Laws 142. 
 59. See generally id. ch. 22, 1993 Minn. Laws 121. 
 60. Id. § 7, 1993 Minn. Laws 126 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 363A.27 (2006)).  
Cf. MINN. STAT. § 609.293, subdiv. 5 (2006) (criminal prohibition of sodomy), 
invalidated by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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D. The Minnesota State DOMA 
Another enactment by the state legislature during the 1990s 
was more uniformly negative for the LGBT community.  In 1997, 
the legislature passed the state’s so-called “Defense of Marriage 
Act” (“DOMA”).61  This was also part of a national trend that 
followed closely upon the 1993 decision of the Hawaii Supreme 
Court in Baehr v. Lewin.62 
In Baehr, the state supreme court held that Hawaii’s ban on 
same-sex marriage discriminated on the basis of sex, and therefore 
needed to satisfy strict scrutiny in order to withstand attack under 
the equal rights amendment contained in that state’s constitution.63  
This first Baehr opinion thus did not definitively require the state to 
recognize same-sex marriages, but only required the state to 
demonstrate on remand that the exclusion of same-sex couples 
satisfied strict scrutiny.64  Nevertheless, the shock waves felt 
throughout the country were enough to set off a wave of state 
“Defense of Marriage Acts” in the next few years.65 
The Minnesota DOMA actually amended a variety of statutes. 
The law’s most central provisions added to the list of prohibited 
marriages “a marriage between persons of the same sex,”66 and then 
added this language to the statutory section listing the types of 
prohibited marriages: 
“A marriage entered into by persons of the same sex, either 
under common law or statute, that is recognized by another 
state or foreign jurisdiction is void in this state and 
contractual rights granted by virtue of the marriage or its 
termination are unenforceable in this state.”67 
 
 61. Act of June 2, 1997, art. 10, 1997 Minn. Laws 1857 (codified at MINN. 
STAT. §§ 517.01, .03, .08, .20 (2006)). 
 62. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
 63. Id. at 63–68. 
 64. Id. at 68 (“On remand, in accordance with the ‘strict scrutiny’ standard, 
the burden will rest on Lewin to overcome the presumption that [the same-sex 
marriage exclusion] is unconstitutional by demonstrating that it furthers 
compelling state interests and is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary 
abridgements of constitutional rights.”). 
 65. Charles E. Mauney, Jr., Landmark Decision or Limited Precedent: Does 
Lawrence v. Texas Require Recognition of a Fundamental Right to Same-Sex Marriage?, 
35 CUMB. L. REV. 147, 153 n.27 (2005) (listing “[s]tates with statutes or state 
constitutional amendments prohibiting same-sex marriage”). 
 66. MINN. STAT. § 517.03, subdiv. 1(a)(4) (2006). 
 67. Id. § 517.03, subdiv. 1(b). 
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This DOMA—which is still in force among the Minnesota 
statutes today—is of course a purely statutory prohibition, rather 
than a constitutional one.  It is completely appropriate that, if 
Minnesota is to have a law restricting same-sex marriage, it take the 
form of a statute rather than a constitutional amendment.  Given 
the fluidity of Minnesota legislative activity on the position of LGBT 
people in society, it is appropriate that the popular opinion not be 
fettered in this area by a constitutional prohibition. 
E. Health Care Benefits Under the Minneapolis Domestic Partner 
Ordinance 
In 1993, the Minneapolis City Council adopted two distinct 
resolutions that had the combined effect of making health 
insurance more available to domestic partners of city employees.  
The first authorized “limited reimbursement to city employees for 
health care insurance costs for same sex domestic partners,”68 while 
the second extended “health care coverage for the partners of 
employees in same-sex domestic partnerships.”69  These “domestic 
partner” resolutions were intended to provide the domestic 
partners of city employees with benefits more comparable to those 
received by the married spouses of similarly situated city employees. 
These Minneapolis City Council resolutions were invalidated 
in two successive state court rulings.  First—in an opinion notable 
for its hostility to lesbian and gay perspectives70—the state district 
court determined that the two resolutions were ultra vires.71  Next, 
 
 68. See Lilly v. Minneapolis (Lilly II), 527 N.W.2d 107, 109 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1995) (describing Res. 93R-106, Minneapolis City Council (Minn. April 2, 1993) 
(enacted)). 
 69. City Council Res. 93R-342, Minneapolis, Minn. (August 27, 1993), quoted 
in Lilly II, 527 N.W.2d at 109. 
 70. For example, as one of its purported “conclusions of law,” the district 
court stated that  
[h]omosexual marriage is an oxymoron since homosexuals are defined 
as those ‘whose desire for sexual relations is directed to a person of the 
same sex,’ and marriage is defined as the union of ‘one man and one 
woman . . . whose association is founded on the distinction of sex.’  
Lilly v. Minneapolis (Lilly I), No. MC 93-21375, 1994 WL 315620, at *4 (Minn. Dist. 
Ct. June 3, 1994).  As an additional “conclusion of law,” the district court offered 
the view that “[r]edefining family relationships is not a proper subject for 
municipal regulation.”  Id.  Although both of these quotations were based in prior 
Minnesota court opinions, they remain expressions of judicial opinion, rather 
than objective fact. 
 71. Lilly I, 1994 WL 315620, at *6. 
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this opinion was affirmed by the state court of appeals72 in language 
that was somewhat more moderate, but no more receptive to 
lesbian and gay concerns.73 
F.  Overview of the Recent History of Legislation in Minnesota 
This brief overview of the recent history of legislation in 
Minnesota demonstrates that the status of the LGBT community 
has been continually a subject of legislative consideration and 
deliberation.  It has been incremental and dynamic. 
It has been incremental in two senses.  First, it has been 
incremental because it has proceeded from one locality to the next, 
rather than becoming effective in all localities at once.  
Minneapolis adopted its LGBT-protective civil rights ordinance in 
1974.74  After one legislative false start, Saint Paul effectively 
amended its human rights ordinance sixteen years later in 1990.  
Then three years later, the State of Minnesota amended its Human 
Rights Act to include anti-discrimination protection on the basis of 
sexual orientation.75  This occurred in a step-by-step fashion over a 
period of years, rather than in one instance throughout the state. 
It has also been incremental because it proceeded from one 
subject matter to the next—rather than applying to all areas 
affecting LGBT people at the same time.  There are various 
respects in which state laws impact LGBT people.  In Minnesota, 
each of these contexts has been addressed separately over time, 
rather than all of them simultaneously.  The earliest of these 
actions was the Minneapolis LGBT-inclusive civil rights ordinance 
in 1974.76  Then the Minnesota Legislature adopted its hate crime 
statute in 1989, which included sexual orientation as a protected 
category from its inception.77  Marriage for same-sex couples was 
statutorily foreclosed in 1989 with the Minnesota DOMA,78 and in 
 
 72. Lilly II, 527 N.W.2d at 108. 
 73. The insistence by the court of appeals in its opinion that sexual 
orientation discrimination is a “statewide problem,” coupled with the court’s 
interpretation of a statute in such a way as to assure that the problem remains 
unaddressed, may be narrowly defensible as a matter of judicial strategy, but could 
hardly be said to be responsive to the issue of discrimination itself.  See id. at 108 
(referencing a statewide problem). 
 74. See supra Part II.A. 
 75. See supra note 58. 
 76. See supra notes 30–33. 
 77. See supra note 50. 
 78. See supra notes 61, 66–67. 
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1993, the Minneapolis City Council attempted to provide health 
care benefits for Minneapolis domestic partners.79  These events 
demonstrate a step-by-step pattern of legislative enactment, rather 
than an all-at-once approach. 
It has also been dynamic in the very evident sense that the 
resulting policies have varied greatly in their perceived effects on 
the LGBT community.  Some of these legislative actions, such as 
the early city civil-rights protections and the state hate-crime 
statute, have been positive.  Others, such as the state DOMA, have 
been more completely negative.  The members of the Minnesota 
LGBT community have needed to withstand a significant number 
of “highs” and “lows” over the years at the hands of the state and 
local legislatures. 
But in almost every case of legislation specifically addressing 
the LGBT community,80 it has been the will of the relevant 
legislature that has prevailed.  With an amendment to the state 
constitution permanently prohibiting recognition of same-sex 
unions, the opponents of the LGBT community on this issue would 
be making an “end run” around the democratic process.  This 
would be unfair to the LGBT community, which in the past has 
always been required to run the legislative gauntlet of popular 
opinion.  Now—to the extent that the LGBT community may 
actually in the future convince the legislature that same-sex civil 
unions, domestic partnerships, or even marriage would be 
advisable or appropriate—opponents would be removing the 
democratic mechanism from the LGBT community’s reach just as 
it may serve to benefit them. 
III. THE RECORD OF LGBT RIGHTS LITIGATION IN MINNESOTA 
COURTS 
The record of major cases decided by Minnesota state courts in 
the field of LGBT rights is by no means one-sided or partisan in 
favor of advancing the LGBT cause.  Indeed, over the years, in 
several major cases specifically touching on LGBT status issues, 
Minnesota courts have been notably cool to the expansion of LGBT 
protections.  It is accordingly unwarranted to assume that state 
 
 79. See supra notes 68–69. 
 80. The exception would be the result in the Lilly cases, in which the lower 
court invalidated key provisions of the Minneapolis domestic partners ordinance.  
See supra notes 68–73 and accompanying text. 
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courts will rush to mandate same-sex marriage. 
A. Baker v. Nelson 
As is frequently noted,81 Minnesota was one of the first 
jurisdictions whose courts addressed issues of same-sex marriage.  
In the 1971 case of Baker v. Nelson, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
held that the statutory exclusion of same-sex couples from 
marrying did not violate the U.S. Constitution.82 
In this decision, the Minnesota high court was not the least bit 
receptive to the concept of same-sex marriage.  First, the court held 
that Minnesota state marriage statutes—which used arguably 
gender-neutral language, at least in places—nevertheless did not 
authorize marriage between persons of the same sex.83  Second, in 
holding that the Federal Constitution did not require a different 
arrangement, the court was unequivocal.84  The unanimous 
opinion recognized the petitioners’ arguments based on such 
broad U.S. Supreme Court precedents as Loving v. Virginia85 and 
Griswold v. Connecticut,86 but narrowly construed these to support 
constitutional protection only for marital couples comprising one 
man and one woman.87 
Although the Baker opinion is over thirty-five years old, it is still 
the law in Minnesota, and has never been seriously questioned by 
the state supreme court.  The continued applicability of the rule in 
Baker seems, at the very least, inconsistent with an alarmist assertion 
 
 81. For example, Professor Collett makes this reference in her article.  See 
Collett, supra note 4, at 1039. 
 82. 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971).  The other major state court case 
of the era was from Washington state.  Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. 
App.), appeal denied, 84 Wash.2d 1008 (1974).  The holding in Singer was broadly to 
the same effect. 
 83. Baker, 291 Minn. at 312, 191 N.W.2d at 186. 
 84. Id. at 315, 191 N.W.2d at 187. 
 85. 388 U.S. 1 (1967), cited in Baker, 291 Minn. at 314, 191 N.W.2d at 187. 
 86. 381 U.S. 479 (1965), cited in Baker, 291 Minn. at 313, 191 N.W.2d at 186. 
 87. For example, the Baker opinion correctly cites the majority opinion in 
Griswold for Justice Douglas’s observation that the statute at issue in that case 
“operates directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife.” Baker, 291 Minn. 
at 313, 191 N.W.2d at 186 (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482).  But the Baker court 
also went on to cite additional language in Griswold of potentially broader scope, 
without acknowledging its potential applicability (“[T]he very idea of [the Griswold 
statute’s] enforcement by police search of ‘the sacred precincts of marital 
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives . . . is repulsive to the 
notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.’”)  Id. (quoting Griswold, 
381 U.S. at 485). 
10. WINER - RC.DOC 4/10/2007  1:03:32 PM 
1074 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:3 
that the Minnesota judiciary is poised to impose a constitutional 
requirement of same-sex marriage availability. 
B. The Lilly Cases 
As noted earlier in this essay,88 the Minneapolis City Council in 
1993 attempted to provide certain health benefits for the same-sex 
domestic partners of its employees.  Both the state district court 
and the court of appeals ruled against Minneapolis and invalidated 
the benefits.89 
The argument advanced by the plaintiff in the cases concerned 
a Minnesota statute that limited the ability of cities to pay health 
benefits to the family members of their employees.90  The statute 
only permitted benefits to spouses, minor unmarried children, and 
dependent students under age twenty-five.91  Both the state district 
court92 and the court of appeals93 accordingly held that the city’s 
action in paying benefits to family members other than those 
specified in the statute was invalid under the statute. 
But as the dissenting judge in the court of appeals decision 
pointed out, the status of Minneapolis as a home rule charter city 
(as opposed to a statutory city) made it eminently arguable that the 
authorization statute did not apply.94  To meet this point, the court 
of appeals determined that Minneapolis’ decision on how to 
compensate its own employees was not a “matter of municipal 
concern,” but rather a “statewide problem.”95  Given that 
determination, the court of appeals then relied on Minnesota 
 
 88. See supra notes 68–73 and accompanying text. 
 89. See supra notes 68 and 71. 
 90. MINN. STAT. § 471.61, subdiv. 1 (2006); cited in Lilly I, passim; quoted in Lilly 
II, 527 N.W.2d at 110. 
 91. MINN. STAT. § 471.61, subdivs. 1, 1a. 
 92. Lilly v. Minneapolis (Lilly I), No. MC 93-21375, 1994 WL 315620, at *5 
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Minn. June 3, 1994) (“Defendant’s Council’s Resolutions 93R-106 
and 93R-342 provide insurance benefits to persons not authorized to receive 
benefits by [Minnesota Statute section] 471.61.”). 
 93. Lilly v. Minneapolis (Lilly II), 527 N.W.2d 107, 113 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) 
(“The City of Minneapolis cannot expand the statute with respect to persons who 
may receive medical benefits and premiums paid at the request of a city employee 
when the legislature by clear definition has made the subject matter one of 
statewide concern and has defined who may receive such benefits.”). 
 94. Id. at 114 (Schumacher, J., dissenting) (“There is no basis to conclude 
that the legislature intended to preempt a home rule charter city’s power to 
provide compensation to its employees in the form of taxable healthcare 
benefits.”). 
 95. Id. at 111 (majority opinion). 
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Supreme Court authority to the effect that if local legislation 
“involve[s] a statewide problem,” courts should “narrowly construe” 
the local legislature’s power to enact the legislation.96 
It probably suffices to note that a city’s decision about its own 
compensation of its own employees, paid for by its own residents, 
will seem to many to be a “matter of municipal concern.”97  It will 
also seem to many that a municipal decision to provide health 
benefits to employees’ families, for which the city’s own taxpayers 
are more than willing to pay, can be viewed as not being a 
“statewide problem” at all.  Indeed, many might assert that it is not 
a problem of any kind—but rather simply a local determination of 
appropriate compensation to local officials. 
In any event, whichever interpretation one believes is more 
reasonable, the point still remains that the Lilly decisions provide 
no support at all for the assertion that Minnesota courts are poised 
to strike down the same-sex marriage exclusion.  Quite to the 
contrary, the indications are largely that there is no basis for such 
an expectation. 
C. The Goins Cases 
Another example concerns the pair of decisions issued by the 
Minnesota appellate courts in 2000 and 2001 regarding the 
employment discrimination claims of a male-to-female transgender 
employee at a major Minnesota-based publishing company.98 
The Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”) is one of the few 
in the United States that is designed to prohibit discrimination on 
the basis of transgender identity.99  But the language the MHRA 
technically uses to describe transgender status is somewhat 
awkward and ambiguous.  The element of the definition of the 
term “transgender” in the MHRA that corresponds to transgender 
status is that portion of the definition providing that “sexual 
 
 96. Id. (citing Welsh v. City of Orono, 355 N.W.2d 117, 120 (Minn. 1984) in 
stating that “[m]ost significantly . . . if the local legislation involves a statewide 
problem, we must apply the supreme court’s most recent directive to ‘narrowly 
construe’ the city’s power to act ‘unless the legislature has expressly provided 
otherwise.’”). 
 97. See id. at 111. 
 98. Goins v. West Group (Goins II), 635 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. 2001); Goins v. 
West Group (Goins I), 619 N.W.2d 424 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000). 
 99. See supra note 44 (concerning St. Paul’s city ordinance which includes 
transgender identity).  The Minnesota state statute’s language, referenced in the 
following text, is similar. 
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orientation” includes “having or being perceived as having a self-
image or identity not traditionally associated with one’s biological 
maleness or femaleness.”100 
In these cases, the employee had wanted to use the female 
restroom that was nearest to her workspace.101  But the employer 
instead required the employee to use one of two single-occupancy 
restrooms at more remote locations.102  In this type of situation, the 
language of the statute can be treated in a number of different 
ways.  For example, the employee—whose self-image is female but 
whose external morphology may be male—is being treated 
differently from employees whose self-image is female but whose 
biological morphology is also female.  On this construction, the 
employer’s behavior could be seen as discriminatory.  This was in 
line with the perspective adopted by the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals.103 
On the other hand, the employer could simply be said to be 
assigning the male restroom for all employees with male external 
genital morphology and the female restroom to all employees with 
female external genital morphology.  This is more in line with the 
perspective adopted by the state supreme court.104  The supreme 
court’s approach, in order to be credible, must be viewed with a 
willingness in mind to discount or even ignore an employee’s 
transgender status.  This approach treats a non-operative, male-to-
female transgender person as though the person were male for all 
relevant purposes; it treats the transgender female as though she 
were essentially male. 
The supreme court’s choice to do this could hardly be said to 
evince respect or solicitude for members of the transgender or 
LGBT communities.  This opinion by the Minnesota Supreme 
Court was ultimately authoritative, and (for better or worse) 
remains the law in Minnesota today.  Like Baker before it, this 
example of judicial action provides no basis for discerning a 
 
 100. MINN. STAT. § 363A.03, subdiv. 44 (2006). 
 101. Goins II, 635 N.W.2d at 721. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Goins I, 619 N.W.2d at 429 (“Goins has made a prima facie case of direct 
discrimination under the MHRA by showing that she was denied the use of a 
workplace facility based on the inconsistency between her self-image and her 
anatomy.”). 
 104. Goins II, 635 N.W.2d at 723 (“[T]he traditional and accepted practice in 
the employment setting is to provide restroom facilities that reflect the cultural 
preference for restroom designation based on biological gender.”). 
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Minnesota judiciary that is predisposed to rule in favor of LGBT 
claims of discrimination. 
D. Doe v. Ventura 
In 2001, the District Court for the Fourth Judicial District in 
Hennepin County invalidated Minnesota’s criminal sodomy statute 
as a violation of the right to privacy guaranteed by the Minnesota 
Constitution.105  The decision was a victory for the state’s LGBT 
community, but the circumstances of its issuance counseled 
restraint in the community’s satisfaction.  The State did not appeal 
the district court’s ruling to the court of appeals, so it remained a 
somewhat less prominent trial court decision.  It was, for example, 
not docketed for official publication, and remains available chiefly 
through commercial electronic databases.  There was accordingly 
no statewide declaration of invalidity on the merits of the case. 
Two short years later, the U.S. Supreme Court decided 
Lawrence v. Texas,106 which invalidated all state laws of this type 
throughout the country under the Due Process Clause of the 
Federal Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment.  This, for better or 
worse, probably had the effect of eclipsing the Doe decision in 
Minnesota.  The issue is now resolved at the federal level, under the 
Federal Constitution.107  Therefore, the situation currently in 
Minnesota—in which the state criminal sodomy law cannot be 
enforced in any part of the state—is more prominently the result of 
federal activity than state judicial action. 
The district court’s action in Doe was both welcomed and 
appreciated by the state’s LGBT community at the time it was 
issued.  But it cannot be taken as an indication of a general 
tendency on the part of Minnesota judges to make broad rulings 
expanding LGBT rights. 
IV. THE FORM OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT AND ITS IMPACT ON 
DEMOCRACY 
This essay has demonstrated that the proposed constitutional 
 
 105. Doe v. Ventura, No. MC 01-489, 2001 WL 543734, at *1 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 
May 15, 2001). 
 106. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 107. Id.  Lawrence struck down as unconstitutional “a Texas statute making it a 
crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual 
conduct.” Id. at 562. 
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amendment would have very wide-ranging consequences, and that 
these would have a profoundly anti-democratic effect on the public 
consideration of LGBT rights.  It has also shown that this anti-
democratic move is especially unjustified, given the historically 
unsympathetic character of the state judiciary’s treatment of LGBT 
causes.108 
But this proposed amendment is anti-democratic in a further 
respect as well.  As already shown earlier in this essay, the 
mechanism of a constitutional amendment in this context is 
inherently anti-democratic because it cuts off the legislative process 
in this area.  And this particular proposal is drafted in such a way 
that the anti-democratic effects are especially firmly assured.  Not 
only is the mechanism of the amendment anti-democratic, but its 
very language seems calculated to maximize its anti-democratic 
effects. 
As noted earlier, what appears to be the most authoritative text 
of the proposed amendment reads as follows: 
“Only the union of one man and one woman shall be 
valid or recognized as a marriage in Minnesota.  Any other 
relationship shall not be recognized as a marriage or its 
legal equivalent.”109 
This language takes the form of an affirmative prohibition of 
legislative activity.  Even if the state legislature at some later point 
determines that it wants to authorize civil unions, or domestic 
partnerships, or same-sex marriage, this amendment anti-
democratically forecloses that possibility—contrary to the then-
effective legislative will. 
Another linguistic formulation would avoid this sharply 
preclusive effect.  An alternative version of such an amendment 
could read as follows: 
No provision of this Constitution shall be interpreted by 
any court to require that marriage be applicable to any 
relationship other than that between one man and one 
woman. 
This language would foreclose the possibility that judges could 
interpret the state constitution to require that marriage be available 
to same-sex couples.  On the other hand, it would still preserve the 
potential that a future state legislature could enact same-sex 
 
 108. See supra Part III. 
 109. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.  
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marriage, civil unions, or domestic partnerships.  Since this 
amendment would work by restricting the interpretive discretion of 
judges, it could be described as using an “interpretational 
approach” to the issue. 
The most active proponents of a constitutional amendment in 
Minnesota have not used an interpretational approach, instead 
opting for an affirmative prohibition, as shown by the first-quoted 
language above.110 
The interpretational approach is well known in constitutional 
discourse.  The Eleventh Amendment to the United States 
Constitution is phrased using the interpretational approach.111  
Even one of the final versions of the unsuccessful federal 
constitutional amendment partially used the interpretational 
approach.112  LGBT activists would still generally be opposed to an 
amendment using the interpretational approach, since it still 
implicitly devalues LGBT relationships.  But it at least has the virtue 
of not foreclosing the democratic process and potentially 
frustrating the will of future legislatures. 
But the Minnesota anti-LGBT activists have not opted for this 
 
 110. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 111. The Eleventh Amendment reads as follows: “The judicial power of the 
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another 
State, or by Citizens of Subjects of any Foreign State.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
In this provision, the “shall not be construed” language is the key phrase that, as 
written at least, determines the way in which the Eleventh Amendment was 
designed to work.  It also uses an interpretational approach, because the limitation 
on “construing” the power of the United States is a limitation on the interpretive 
discretion of judges. 
 112. The so-called “Federal Marriage Amendment” was rejected by the Senate, 
by a vote of forty-nine to forty-eight, on June 6, 2006.  152 CONG. REC. S5441-42 
(daily ed. June 6, 2006).  The text of that amendment reads as follows: 
“Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man 
and a woman.  Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any 
state, shall be construed to require that marriage or the legal incidents 
thereof be conferred upon any union other than the union of a man and 
a woman.” 
S.J. Res. 40, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 8, 2004).  Although this bill was introduced 
in 2004, the Senate voted on its adoption in 2006.  The second sentence of the bill 
was cast using the interpretational approach, but the first sentence was not.  The 
result of this bifurcated structure was that the bill affirmatively prohibited formal 
marriage for same-sex couples, but relied on the interpretational approach for its 
treatment of alternative arrangements, such as civil unions and domestic 
partnerships.  Obviously, it would be more respectful of LGBT relationships (if 
one were to have such an amendment at all) to use the interpretational approach 
for the entirety of the proposal. 
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more democratic approach.  In choosing the linguistic pattern that 
maximizes the anti-democratic potential of their amendment, they 
betray not only the extent of their animosity to the concerns of 
LGBT people, but also their callousness to the workings of 
democracy.113 
V. CONCLUSION 
The proposed marriage discrimination amendment to the 
Minnesota Constitution is profoundly anti-democratic.  It is 
extremely wide-ranging in its scope, it obliterates the opportunity 
of the LGBT community to legislatively advance its interests in the 
area, it falsely assumes characteristics of the state judiciary that do 
not in fact exist, and it is drafted with language that is particularly 
hostile to LGBT concerns and democracy in general.  It was a 
triumph for reason and democracy that this amendment was 
defeated in 2006.  It should never be introduced again.  In the 




 113. In her foregoing essay, Professor Collett complains that some pro-LGBT 
commentators ascribe bigotry or homophobia to those who oppose same-sex 
marriage.  Collett, supra note 4, at 1052–53.  It is not my purpose in this essay to 
ascribe bigoted or homophobic motivations to anyone.  But proponents of a 
constitutional amendment against same-sex marriage should recall that they have 
purposely chosen the linguistic pattern for their amendment that maximizes the 
amendment’s anti-democratic effects, as indicated in the text above.  This 
linguistic choice, also as explained above, maximizes the restrictive effects on the 
LGBT community.  Proponents of this amendment in particular, drafted the way it 
has been, should therefore be able to understand why some in the LGBT 
community might distrust their motives, given that the amendment’s proponents 
had readily available other linguistic models with more moderate effects. 
